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Do local labour market policies of municipalities matter? The scientific debates on 
local labour markets policies concentrates mainly on (1) the effects of active labour 
market policies and programmes as such, which are in general and on the long term 
disputable and  small, (2) questions of governance, management and partnerships. In 
this paper we explore both dimensions. First by describing the reforms in the 
Netherlands in which the financial responsibility for social assistance is decentralised 
to 443 municipalities, second by identifying, measuring and comparing the effects of 
labour market strategies of municipalities on the in- and outflow of social assistance. 
In an empirical analysis we find effects of control, activation, employment creation 
and coordination on the in- en outflow of social assistance. This suggest that activities 




There is a well documented paradigm shift from welfare to workfare regimes in 
modern western societies over the last decades (Van Berkel & Borghi, 2007; OECD, 
2003, 1999; Lødemel & Tricky, 2000). In the Netherlands this shift also has taken 
place. Over the last two decades there have been reforms in both the conditions of 
unemployment benefits and social assistance, the level of income-replacement and the 
administrative organisation of social  insurance, social assistance and employment 
services. A central notion is that work precedes income. In this paper we concentrate 
on the administrative reforms which culminated in the SUWI-act in 2002 and the 
Work and Social Assistance Act in 2004. The main principles underlie the SUWI-act 
were privatisation of re-integration services, deregulation and decentralisation. The 
Netherlands by example was the first to implement a full commercial reintegration 
market, where private sector organisations compete for tenders to supply employment 
services (Tergeist & Grubb, 2006). More important, the 2004 Work and Social 
Assistance Act gives municipalities full responsibility for activating and reintegrating 
their 340.000 social assistance clients. Full responsibility includes financial 
responsibility and risk bearing. They receive lump-sum payments from the national 
government, based on socio-economic parameters that take into account the 
demographic and regional labour market situation. There are two financing 
components: for benefit payments and reintegration measures. The new model creates 
incentives for reducing social assistance benefits since saved money originally 
earmarked for benefits can be transferred to other budget lines. Municipalities now 
also have more discretion in choosing the type of measure for activating their 
beneficiaries (Tergeist & Grubb, 2006; Van Berkel, 2006).  
 
Above all, this financial responsibility for social assistance-caseload means a stimulus 
for municipalities to maximise effectivity and efficiency. Therefore they have to 
influence the outcome of the local labour market, prevent income dependency and 
promote job openings. A crucial question in this respect is whether local labour 
market policies of municipalities matter? Can local governments indeed influence the 
in- and outflow of social assistance?  In the literature two strands of conceptualisation 
of local labour market policies can be identified. The first is an instrumental way of 
thinking, suggesting that active labour market policy consists of different kinds of 
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policy instruments and programmes such as mediation, job creation, schooling and 
vocational training etc. This is the mainstream way of thinking, which has been 
subject of a body of evaluation research done so far (De Koning et al., 2007; Kluve et 
al., 2007, Martin & Grubb, 2001). They found that the direct, micro effects of these 
active labour market instruments are small and that the macro-effects for the nation as 
a whole are disputable. Second, local labour market policies can be viewed from a 
governance way of view. Local labour markets are viewed ‘..as a place of co-
operation between local actors, and thus as a level of management, in areas such as 
problem identification and analysis, implementation and assessment of ALMP’s 
(active labour market policies) and the carrying-out of local initiatives and projects 
(OECD, 1998: 15). In this respect, not just the instruments are of interest, but the way 
they are managed and coordinated, in co-operation with other agents.    
 
This paper focuses on the social assistance benefit system and makes an assessment of 
the effects that different municipal policy strategies have on the in- and outflow of the 
municipal number of social assistance benefit recipients for the period 1999-2007. 
The inflow minus outflow rate defines the net change in benefit recipients. This 
enables us to test the effect of institutional reforms and differences in municipal 
policy strategies on the developments in social assistance in The Netherlands. In 
section 2 a brief overview is presented of the developments of main Dutch social 
security arrangements of the past three decades. Section 3 provides a more in-depth 
description of developments in the municipal social assistance benefits. Section 4 
identifies the main municipal policy strategies with respect to social assistance. 
Section 5 discusses the data used and methodological set-up applied in this paper. 
Section 6 shows the empirical results and finally section 7 concludes. 
 
 
Renewing need for local labour market policy  
 
About 25 years ago, policies on the Dutch welfare system changed course. The call 
for this policy reform originated from the fact that the number of benefits paid out to 
people under the age of 65 had more than doubled in ten years - from 0.6 million in 
1974 to 1.4 million in 1984. On top of that came the growth in old-age pensions, as a 
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result of the aging population. The number of working people in that same period did 
not increase, despite the population growth. See figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Decomposition of population between 15-64 in The Netherlands by 
main source of income 1970-2008 
 
Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
 
Since then, many reforms in the main Dutch social security arrangements and 
employment services have been implemented. These arrangements comprise social 
insurance benefits for unemployment and disability and social assistance benefits. For 
the first two types of benefits, employers and employees pay an insurance premium 
from which benefits are paid in case of layoff or disability. Social assistance provides 
a social minimum income to those not (fully) eligible to any of the other 
arrangements. This type of benefit is financed by the national government. Social 
insurance arrangements are nowadays carried out by an independent organisation, 
social assistance is nowadays completely decentralised to municipalities in which 
recipients live. The national government distributes funds to municipalities from 
which they pay social assistance benefits.  
 
Figure 2 shows the development in these three main social security arrangements in 
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disability. From its outset in 1967, it has been on an increasing pace, particularly after 
the 1975 recession. This was caused by the possibility that partly disabled 
unemployed were entitled to obtain a full disability benefit, instead of a lower 
unemployment benefit. Even though this option was abolished in 1987, the upward 
trend remained until the first major reform in the early 1990’s. This reform restricted 
eligibility and established an independent supervisory board. This immediately led to 
a drop in the number of disability benefit recipients. A much more extensive reform in 
2002, focusing more on participation of (partly) disabled, than on mere income 
support for disabled, implied an even larger fall. 
 
Figure 2. Main social security arrangements in The Netherlands: social 
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Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
Unemployment insurance benefits form the smallest, but most cyclical, social security 
arrangement. Eligibility depends on job duration of employees and this criterion was 
also tightened in a number reforms. The number of social assistance benefits lies in 
between the other two. The recessions of the early 1980’s caused an explosion in the 
number of social assistance benefits from 200 thousand in 1980 to 550 thousand in 
1985. In fact, social insurance benefits are allocated to individuals, whereas a social 
assistance benefit pertains to the household an individual belongs to. When there are 
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other household members with an income, this implies a lower or no social assistance 
benefit.  
 
The social assistance system has also been subject to reform in the past 15 years. 
Basically social assistance has evolved from a social income support system to a 
participation and unemployment provision. In 1996 the New Social Assistance Act for 
example sets a new legal framework in which the entitlements for social assistance 
were coupled to duties to seek work and more discretion and instruments for 
municipalities to activate welfare recipients and enforce behaviour. Besides eligibility 
and job search requirements, also the financing by the national government has been 
subject to reforms. Until 2001 municipalities basically could claim the expenses they 
made on behalf of social assistance benefits to the national authorities. In case there 
were more benefit recipients than anticipated, municipalities could simply claim the 
additional costs, in case there were less recipients they simply repaid the surplus. The 
rationale behind this was the premise that municipalities had no effect on the 
occurrence of unemployment and hence (in the end) social assistance. However, this 
finance scheme implied no incentive for municipalities to limit inflow or stimulate 
outflow of these benefit recipients. This implied an asymmetric pattern in social 
assistance benefits, as can be observed from figure 2, where increases were rapid and 
steep, whereas decreases were slow and shallow. 
 
Reforms in the finance scheme subsequently increase the financial responsibility of 
municipalities. First in 2001 when municipalities could claim 75% of the costs of 
social assistance at the national government, while the remaining 25% was budgeted 
distributed to them by the national government based on criteria independent of the 
number of social benefit recipients. With the 2004 Work and Social Assistance Act, 
100% of the costs of social assistance and reintegration measures were budgeted to 
municipalities, based on socio-economic parameters that take into account the 
demographic and regional labour market situation. Hence, when benefit costs exceed 
those of this budget, the municipality has to find other resources, which usually means 
less for other municipal measures. On the other hand, less benefit costs than budgeted, 
implies the full amount of this surplus is at the municipality’s discretion. The rationale 
behind these reforms was both a shift in thoughts on social assistance from income 
support to participation provider, and shift in incentives to municipalities to limit 
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inflow and stimulate outflow of social assistance benefit recipients (Van Geuns & 
Van Gent, 2007). These reforms finalised an ongoing decentralisation process in de 
execution of the social assistance provision in The Netherlands. The drop in social 
assistance benefits after 1996 and 2004 is usually connected to these reforms (see 
figure 2) (Bosselaar et al, 2007; CPB, 2006). 
 
The lump sum financing of benefits and reintegration measures renewed the role of 
local labour market policy. After all, municipalities now have an intrinsic interest in 
preventing inflow and promoting outflow from social assistance, alone or together 
with other municipalities, public or private employment agencies etc. In section 5. we 
identify different strategies municipalities can carry out. First we look at the spatial 
characteristics of social assistance.    
 
 
Spatial characteristics of social assistance in The Netherlands 
 
The provision of social assistance benefits in The Netherlands is carried out by the 
municipalities. The number of benefits in relation to the number of households in a 
municipality differs greatly. Figure 3 shows the number of social assistance recipients 
as percentage of the number of households per municipality in 2007. This percentage 
is highest in the municipalities in the rural areas in the north-eastern part of The 
Netherlands and in the large cities in the West, like Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The 
Hague. Also in some southern municipalities the social assistance percentage is 
relatively high. In municipalities other than the larger cities, this percentage is 
relatively low.  
 
The average annual percentage rate of change in the number of social assistance 
benefits between 1999-2007 was negative for a large majority of municipalities 
(figure 4). This confirms the falling trend of the number of social assistance benefits 
of figure 2. Only a small number of scattered municipalities in the central part of the 
country saw their benefits increase in the period 1999-2007. The largest fall in benefit 
recipients took place in municipalities at the ‘edge’ of the country, particularly at the 
northern, western and southern borders. The fall in municipalities at the German 
border was less pronounced. 
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Figures 5 and 6 show the average annual inflow into and outflow out of social 
assistance per household over the period 1999-2007 by municipality. These figures 
show a clear dichotomy in these inflow and outflow rates between the North and 
West. Both rates are on average high in the northern part of The Netherlands, 
indicating higher reallocation of social assistance recipients in the North than 
elsewhere. Reallocation is on the other hand relatively low in the western part of The 
Netherlands, apart from the large cities. Figures 5 and 6 confirm that in- and outflow 
move in a coherent way. This is also shown in figure 7, showing the aggregate 
national inflow into and outflow out of social assistance in thousands of benefit 
recipients. It also shows that after 2004, particularly a fall in the inflow of recipients 
accounted for the fall in social assistance, whereas the outflow remained more or less 
flat after 2001. 
 























Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 
Figure 5. Average annual inflow in social assistance as percentage of the number 








Figure 6. Average annual outflow in social assistance as percentage of the 








Source: Statistics Netherlands 
 

















Source: Statistics Netherlands 
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Municipal policy strategies with respect to social assistance 
 
The basic question to be answered by local labour market policy is which problem 
with respect to the social assistance system needs solving. Based on economic 
literature five different problem areas can be distinguished.  
 
1. Moral Hazard 
Moral hazard implies unintentional and undesirable behaviour of benefit recipients, 
because municipalities are confronted with asymmetric information regarding these 
recipients, which makes it impossible to correctly judge their situation. An example is 
job application behaviour, because the actual job interviews are out of the 
municipality’s reach. The problem of moral hazard is part and parcel of social 
assistance (and in fact any social security arrangement) and boils down to the 
difficulty of executing an efficient system of control over the benefit recipient. Before 
the 2004 reforms, this lack of control also pertained to the relation between 
municipalities and central authorities, because municipalities could simply pass on 
benefit costs to the national government.  
 
There is a dual response of  municipalities to the problem of moral hazard. First, there 
is a policy of threat, which boils down to demanding specific actions in return to 
receiving a benefit, like Work-First arrangements (Graversen & Van Ours, 2009, 
2008; Rosholm & Svarer, 2008; Van Ours, 2007, Black et al., 2003). Second, and in 
addition to a policy of threat is a policy of strict control. This policy involved 
controlling benefit recipients for other sources of income, for active job search 
behaviour and other possible fraudulent activities.   
 
2. Productivity shortfall 
A second problem for municipalities with respect to social assistance and associated 
unemployment is the fact that many job searchers have too low a level of productivity 
to be able to earn a wage that is beyond the benefit level. This productivity shortfall 
can be caused by inadequate qualification, lack of work experience and the like. The 
main reasons for this productivity shortfall lie at the heart of active labour market 
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policies of a municipality. Such policies comprise schooling and training, (subsidised) 
trainee posts and subsidised jobs. 
 
The problems of moral hazard and productivity shortfall basically consider the social 
assistance problem of municipalities from a micro-level point of view. The other 
problems are dealing with social assistance from a more macro/regional point of view. 
 
3. Allocation 
The problem of allocation is in fact the core of the public job exchange system. The 
basic idea behind this problem is the fact that labour supply and demand do not 
automatically meet or that market failure leads to a sub-optimal outcome (and hence 
unemployment or labour shortage). Policy measures that deal with this problem 
involve enhancing labour market transparency through better information for job 
searchers about vacancies and better information for employers about the potential of 
job searchers (De Koning, 2007; 2003).  
 
4. Labour demand 
This fourth problem regarding social assistance poses that there is insufficient demand 
for workers. In order to avoid benefit-dependency and unemployment municipalities 
should stimulate regular employment within their community. One way to do that is 
to make the municipality a favourable place of business, as to attract firms to settle in 
the municipality. Another way is to invest in municipal infrastructure and dwellings. 
Both the policy to stimulate places of business in the municipality and investment 
policies carry the danger of inefficiencies, as job searchers from other municipalities 
also benefit from these activities. This leads to free rider behaviour (Van Dam, 1992). 
 
Another angle from which to look at this problem is to stimulate subsidised 
employment. Particularly since the early 1990’s municipalities in The Netherlands 
have had a host of instruments to create subsidised employment. All these subsidised 
jobs are now an integral part of the of the 2004 Work and Income Act.  
 
5. Co-ordination 
Municipal competition and free rider behaviour related to the previous point, almost 
automatically imply the need for better co-operation and co-ordination (OECD, 2003). 
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The idea behind this problem area of social assistance is the premise that individual 
municipalities themselves cannot directly affect the way labour markets function, but 
jointly with others they (perhaps) can. The prerequisites for this are better in case 
municipalities working together than in isolation. In practice co-ordination manifests 
itself in different ways and with different actors. Co-ordination improves the local 
execution of social assistance (governance) and enhances the efficiency of local active 
labour market policy. Table 1 summarizes the different local labour market strategies 
from which municipalities can choose and gives their main characteristics. 
 






































































Methodology and data 
 
Now that the different policy options a municipality can make regarding social 
assistance are clear, we move to answering the question of the effectiveness of these 
strategies in bringing down the burden of social assistance. This is done by specifying 
and estimating models of inflow into and outflow out of social assistance. As a first 
step, these models only have the objective characteristics of each municipality, 
irrespective of those of social assistance benefit recipients, as explanatory variables. 
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As a second step, we investigate these models by adding indicators for each of these 
policy strategies and test their impact on in- and outflow.  
 
Our models starts from a log-linear specification, implying a multiplicative relation 
between the variables, with the inflow (outflow) rate as dependent variable. Inflow 
(outflow) rate is here defined as the ratio of inflow (outflow) into (out of) social 
assistance in period t and the total number of social assistance benefits at the start of 
that period. We experimented with different denominators, but we have chosen this 
one for both in- and outflow for reasons of comparability and because the difference 
between these in- and outflow rates approximates the percentage growth of the 
number of benefits, as the equation below shows.  
 
( ) 111 −−− −=−= tititititititititi SABOUTSABINSABSABOUTINSAB ,,,,,,,,, or ∆∆
   (1) 
 
where SABi,t is the number of social assistance beneficiaries in municipality i in at the 
start of year t, INi,t is the inflow into social assistance in municipality i in year t, i.e. 
between t-1 and t, and likewise OUT is the outflow out of social assistance. The 
explanatory variables of our model comprise demographic, financial, educational and 
labour market variables in addition to region, size, political and other dummies to 
characterise each municipality. In addition, we will later also include indicators 
representing the various municipal policy strategies we distinguish.  
 
In general form the specification for the inflow rate and outflow rate is 
 
 





















   (2) 
 
where Y is the relevant dependent variable Y ={inflow, outflow (to a job)} during a 
period t, i.e. between time t-1 and t. Each of these dependent variables is divided by 
the total number of social assistance benefit recipients (SAB) at the beginning of that 
period. Note that in order to take account of annual municipal redivisions, all 
variables have been rearranged to the 2007 municipality list, which amounts to 443 
municipalities, so i={1,…,443}. The time period covers the years 1999 through 2007, 
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so t={1999,…,2007}. This implies we have a panel structure of 443 cross sections 
(municipalities) and 9 time periods. 
 
Note that α0,t represents period fixed effects in order to account for effects of time.1 
We are interested in how much of the variation in inflow and outflow rates is 
explained by policy strategies on top of objective variables. Cross-section fixed 
effects would interfere with these policy variables, which is why we abstain from 
these effects. We do take account of possible region or size effects to the in- and 
outflow rates. The explanatory variables are all captured by the variables xj and are 
described in table 2. The various indicators for our policy strategies are represented by 
the zk’s are in table 3 and ε is the white noise error process. 
 
Table 2. Explanatory variables: objective municipal characteristics, plus 
expected effects 
Variables xj Definition Effect on: 
  inflow outflow 
Single-parent households Number of single-parent households as share of total 
number of households 
+ - 
Low incomes Households with low income as share of total number of 
households 
+ - 
Minorities Number of minorities as share of total population + - 
House value Total value of the stock of houses as share of the total 
number of houses 
- + 
Low educated Number of persons between 15-64 with low education as 
share of population of 15-64 
+ - 
Unemployment insurance Unemployment insurance benefits as share of population 
of 15-64 
+/- +/- 
VU-ratio Ratio of open vacancies and unemployed labour force in 
the COROP the municipality is in 
- + 
Municipal jobs Number of jobs as share of the population of 15-64 - + 
Address density Ratio of the number of surrounding addresses and 
municipal surface (urbanisation measure) 
+/- +/ 
Left wing parties Share of left wing city council seats +/ +/ 
                                                 
1 Note that adding lagged dependent variables in order to take account of residual autocorrelation and 
the possibility of unit roots is not required in this case. This approach also evades dependency on 
serial correlation and unit root tests, which are notoriously unreliable incase of short time spans and 
numerous cross-sections. 
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Local parties Share of local political party seats in city council +/ +/ 
Region Dummy for region is which municipal is located (North, 
East, West, South) 
+/ +/ 
Size Dummy of size class of municipality by number of 
inhabitants (> 100,000; 50,000-100,000; 20,000-50,000 




Table 3. Explanatory variables: indicators of municipal policy strategies 




Number of traced fraud cases as share of total average social assistance 
benefits (threat) 
 Inflow in disability arrangement for persons with no work experience (Wajong) 
as share of population 15-64 (clear stock of benefit recipients / substitution) 
 Inflow in sheltered workshops (WSW) as share of population 15-64 (clear 
stock of benefit recipients / substitution) 
Activating social 
assistance 
Number of non-subsidised re-integration courses as share of population 15-64 
(work-first kind of courses) 
 Number of subsidised re-integration courses as share of  population 15-64 
(includes positing recipients at external firms or agencies) 
Labour demand  Municipal per capita expenses on Economic Affairs 
 Growth rate of municipal establishments 
Co-ordination Intensity of co-operation with external partners (dummy) 
 Range of fields of external co-operation (dummy) 
 Intensity of co-operation within municipality (dummy) 
 Range of fields of internal co-operation (dummy) 
 
 
Our specification approach is to first estimate model based solely on the objective 
explanatory variables and as a second step add the policy variables and assess the 
extent to which they add to explaining the variation of inflow and outflow rates and 
hence account for the change in the number of social assistance benefits. Most data 
we use are taken from data bases of Statistics Netherlands. The exact sources and 






Table 4 presents the estimation results of equation (1) for the inflow and outflow rate 
and the outflow rate to work, where βi =0, i.e. excluding the policy strategies. The 
specification approach is from general to specific regarding the objective variables. 
Later on the effect of these policy strategies is tested based on the simplified models 
from this approach. Note that some policy strategy indicators are only available for 
the period 2004-2007. Furthermore, the outflow rate out of social assistance to work is 
also available for this limited sample. The lagged outflow rate that enters the model 
limits the total time period on which the outflow-model is based to three years: 2005-
2007. Table 4 only shows the simplified models, where the index i is omitted for 
convenience. 
 
Table 4. Estimation results of equation (2); simplified models only 
 
Model of  ( )tSAB SABY 1log − , where 
 YSAB  is total inflow  YSAB  is total outflow YSAB  is outflow to work 
 Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value Coefficient t-value 
       
Period fixed effects Y  Y  Y  
Intercept -2.562 (25.25) -1.760 (-16.54) -1.913 (-12.95) 
Log low income hh. -0.137 (-3.540) -0.135 (-3.682)   
Log single-parent hh.  -0.325 (-9.761) -0.018 (-2.876) -0.079 (-3.780) 
Log minorities -0.026 (-4.064) -0.039 (-5.910) -0.050 (-4.250) 
Log house value -0.108 (-4.667) -0.130 (-5.563)   
Log low educated       
Log unemployed (UI)   -0.051 (-2.975)   
Log VU-ratio -0.072 (-4.778) -0.066 (-4.791) -0.156 (-5.558) 
Log municipal jobs       
Log address density -0.013 (-2.858) -0.012 (-2.875)   
Log left wing parties       
Log local parties       
Region       
North 0.060 (3.334) 0.057 (3.505) 0.189 (6.291) 
East       
West   -0.023 (-2.284)   
Size (inhabitants)       
> 100,000     0.251 (3.782) 
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50,000-100,000     0.194 (4.124) 
20,000-50,000     0.113 (4.533) 
       
Adjusted R2  0.231  0.310  0.553  
Municipalities (N) 443  443  443  
Time periods (T) 9  9  4  
N×T 3987  3987  1772  
Durbin-Watson (DW) 1.535  1.506  1.377  
Note that outliers (maximum six per model, i.e. 6 municipality-year combinations) were removed 
 
 
Next we assess the plausibility of the estimation results of table 4. Note that the 
specification in logs ensures hat the estimated parameter values can be interpreted as 
elasticities, i.e. a 1%-point rise in xj raises the inflow or outflow rate by αj %-points. 
Looking first at the inflow model, table 4 shows that the demographic variables, share 
of single households and share of minorities, both have a negative effect on inflow 
rate into social assistance. This seems counterintuitive as these groups have a higher 
chance of being part of social assistance. However do note that we should evaluate the 
estimation results of the inflow and outflow models jointly instead of separately, as 
they together determine the change in the number social assistance recipients. Table 4 
also shows that in the outflow model both the share of minorities and single-
households have a negative effect, but that is the expected sign. So these demographic 
variables dampen both inflow and outflow and might still have a positive effect on the 
share of social assistance and its rate of change in a municipality. The same holds for 
the share of low income households and the average house value. Comparing 
elasticities of the inflow and outflow model shows that they differ significantly only 
for the share of single-parent households. Hence only single households exert a clear 
negative effect on the change in social assistance recipients. The overall effect of 
minorities on change in social assistance is on the other hand positive. 
 
The vacancy-unemployment (VU) ratio has a strong negative effect on inflow. Indeed 
when there is a tight labour market in the region surrounding the municipality (i.e. a 
high VU-ratio), the chances of finding work are high so there is less inflow into social 
assistance. Finally, we find that urbanisation lowers the inflow rate, whereas 
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municipalities in the north of The Netherlands have a higher inflow rate. There is no 
effect of municipal size or political colour or the council. 
 
As we already argued, the outflow model is more or less the spitting image of that of 
the inflow rate. Only the share of unemployed in unemployed insurance (UI) and 
municipalities in the western part of the country exert additional influence on outflow. 
Do note however that the outflow out of social assistance not necessarily means 
outflow to a (regular) job. This outflow also covers outflow due to e.g. disability, 
retirement, education, marriage (with a partner with an own income). Only roughly 
40% of outflow out of social assistance between 2004-2007 was due to finding 
employment. This model of outflow to work has a shorter sample period that total 
outflow. However, our conclusion regarding the total outflow model also hold in this 
case. Only the size of the municipality now matters as well. The largest municipalities 
in terms of inhabitants, have the highest outflow rates to work. 
 
Table 5 presents a summary of the contribution that each of the explanatory variables 
grouped together to highlight municipal aspect make to the in- and outflow models. 
We distinguish the role of demographics, i.e. the composition of inhabitants and 
households in terms of single-parent households and minorities,  the wealth of a city 
(house value, low income households), urbanisation (address density, size classes) and 
regional labour market (unemployment, VU-ratio and regional dummies). Table 5 
shows that the inflow into social assistance is for about 80% determined by the 
composition of inhabitants and households of a municipality. Another important 
component is city wealth, which explains about 15% of the inflow. The contribution 
of urbanisation and regional labour market is only limited. On the other hand, we do 
find a substantial contribution of regional labour markets on the outflow out of social 
assistance (28%). Also in this case the contribution of demographics and particularly 
wealth is quite high (with 27% and 43% respectively). The remaining effect of 
urbanisation is again small. Finally, the outflow to employment is based on a much 
shorter time span (2004-2007) and is therefore much less comparable to the overall 
inflow and outflow models, which are based on 1999-2007. Again the demographic 
composition has the largest contribution to outflow to work (72%), while the regional 
labour market contributes about 20%. Urbanisation explains the remaining 8%. The 
wealth effect has now vanished. 
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Table 5. Contribution to explained variation in inflow and outflow of social 
assistance 
Contribution of Inflow  Outflow  Outflow to work 
- Demographics  81.2 26.7 72.2 
- Wealth 14.9 42.7   
- Urbanisation 1.0 2.4 8.4 
- Regional labour market 3.0 28.2 19.5 
Note: calculation based on the mean absolute value times the coefficients of table 4 (see also Broersma 
and Oosterhaven, 2009 – tables 5 and 6) 
 
As a second step the models of table 4 are augmented with indicators of municipal 
policy strategies and re-estimated in order to assess the effect of these different 
strategies on inflow and outflow rates on top of the earlier explanatory (objective) 
variables. Table 6 shows the estimation results when instruments for each of the 
policy strategies of table 1 are added to the models of table 4. In that way table 5 
shows the extent to which different policy strategies have an effect on inflow in and 
outflow out of social assistance of at least at 10%. The number of instruments chosen 
is limited to those in table 5. 
 
Regarding  a social security strategy with an emphasis on control, table 6 shows that 
the threat argument (tracing more fraud cases) has no significant effect on inflow or 
outflow. Only the other instrument in this strategy of cleansing the stock of benefit 
recipients to assess the extent to which recipients might fall in some other social 
security arrangement has an effect on outflow to employment. A rise of the inflow 
into the Wajong (disability arrangement for persons with no working experience) 
raises the outflow of social assistance to work. More persons moving into the Wajong 
instead of social assistance means that the better equipped for work remain so the 
outflow to work may rise. There is no significant effect of the WSW (sheltered work 
for disabled).  
 
As far as an activating policy strategy is concerned, table 6 shows that this only has a 
significant negative effect on the inflow rate and no effect on outflow. Hence, courses 
and subsidised jobs are more of a deterrent to enter social assistance than indicators of 
the control strategy. The labour demand strategy, in terms of municipal Economic 
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Affairs expenditures, lowers the inflow into social assistance.  What does have an 
effect on the outflow, both general and to a job, is co-operation both external, with 
other partners, and internal, between municipal departments. They provide arguments 
in favour of a better functioning of the local labour market as a result of external and 
internal co-operation. Therefore potential outflow is stimulated.  
 
Table 6. Elasticities of instruments of policy strategies on in- and outflow 
Policy strategy Instruments Inflow model Outflow model Outflow to work model 
Share of fraud cases    
Inflow Wajong    
Controlling 
social 









 Share of subsidized 
jobs 




expenses (per cap) 
-0.020  0.019 
 Growth rate 
establishments 
   
Scope of external 
cooperation 
 0.019 0.033  
Co-ordination 
 Range of internal 
cooperation 
 0.130 0.283 
When no elasticity is reported, the effect of the policy variable was not insignificantly different from 





The results of the previous paragraph show that local labour market policies matter for 
the inflow and outflow and thus the rate of change of municipal social assistance 
benefits. Different policy strategies have an effect on both inflow into social 
assistance and outflow out of social assistance. These outcomes point towards an a 
labour market policy focused on co-ordination and investment in courses en 




Nevertheless these effects are small. In terms of the number of additional measures to 
be taken in order to reduce inflow with 1 person or stimulate outflow with one person, 
a lot of efforts have to be made. For one person to less enter social security, an 
arbitrary municipality needs some 50 additional courses, or 50 additional subsidised 
jobs, or an additional 8 euro per capita spending on municipal Economic Affairs. At 
the same time an additional 9 euro per head raises outflow to work with 1 person. This 
implies that expenses on municipal Economic Affairs with say 9 euro per head, will 
give a drop in social assistance of two persons. When the number of WSW-
entitlements within an average municipality rises with 11 persons, this will lower 
outflow to work with one person. The effects of scope and range of co-operation can 
not be assessed in the same manner, but they have a positive effect on outflow (to 
work), but no effect on inflow. 
 
This corroborates the limited effect of municipal policies in lowering unemployment 
that has been found in other, noticeably evaluation, studies as in De Koning et al. 
(2007); Kluve et al. (2007), Martin & Grubb (2001). Nevertheless these effects are 
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Data appendix – Model variables 
 
Name Short description Source 
Inflow Inflow into social assitance as share of social asistance 
(at start of period) 
Statistics Netherlands 
outflow Outlow out of social assistance as share of social 









Share of sigle parent households in total number of 
households 
Statistics Netherlands 
Minorities Share of minorities of non-Western descent in total 
population 
Statistics Netherlands 
Low incomes Share of households with income at the lowest 4 deciles 
of the natoinal income distribution 
Statistics Netherlands 
House value Total house value as share of total housing stock Statistics Netherlands 
Low educated Share population between 15-64 sith a low education (at 




Share of persons between 15-64 with a UI benefit Statistics Netherlands 
VU-ratio Ratio of vacancies and unemploy labour force in the 




Ratio of jobs and the population between 15-64 Statistics Netherlands 
Address density Number of addresses  per km2 Statistics Netherlands 
Left wing 
parties 
Share of (national) left wing parties in municipal council 
(D66, PvdA, GL, SP) 
University of 
Groningen COELO 
Local parties Share of local parties in municipal council University of 
Groningen COELO 
Fraud cases Share of fraud cases in average number of persons on 
social asistance 
Divosa and Statistics 
Netherlands 
Inflow Wajong Ratio of inflow in Wajong arrangement and population 
between 15-64 (at start of period) 
Statistics Netherlands 
Inflow WSW Ratio of inflow in WSW and population between 15-64 
(at start of period) 
Ministry of Social 

















Number of external parties a municipality is co-





Number of internal departments a municipality is co-
operating with in temrs oflocal labour markets 
Divosa 
 
 
 
